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AFTERWORD: A THOUGHT ABOUT 

FEMINIST LITIGATION STRATEGIES 

V ALORIE VOJDIK* 
As a feminist litigator, I continue to struggle with the deci­
sion of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination 
("MCAD") in Stropnicky v. Nathanson, which held that Judith Na­
thanson's decision to represent only women in divorce proceedings 
constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.1 The contributors persua­
sively advance a number of reasons why Nathanson should be 
permitted to represent only women, at least under certain circum­
stances: that her action is a benign compensatory measure to rem­
edy the effects of past discrimination; that her choice is an 
associational right protected by ·the First Amendment;2 that she has 
the right to be protected from compelled speech;3 and that as an 
attorney, she should have the right to decline to represent clients 
based upon her personal preferences.4 As a lawyer who has liti­
gated on behalf of women challenging gender discrimination, I now 
ask a different question. Even assuming that Nathanson has the 
legal right to refuse to represent Joseph Stropnicky solely because 
he is male, should a feminist lawyer make that choice? 
I share Nathanson's desire to devote her energy and talents to 
the elimination of gender inequity. As a feminist lawyer, though, I 
am concerned about the means she has chosen to redress discrimi­
nation against women. Nathanson could have chosen to represent 
clients based not on their sex, but on the basis of their legal claim. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. 
A.B., 1982, Brown University; J.D., 1986, New York University. The author was lead 
counsel to Shannon Faulkner and Nancy Mellette in their lawsuit which successfully 
challenged the males-only admission policy of The Citadel, The Military College of 
South Carolina. . . 
1. 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25, 1997). 
2. See Bruce K. Miller, Lawyers' Identities, Client Selection and the Antidis­
crimination Principle: Thoughts on the Sanctioning. of Juditi! Nathanson, 20 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 93 (1998). 
3. See Leora Harpaz, Compelled Lawyer ·Represeniation and ·the Free Speech 
Rights of Attorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 49 (1998). 
4. See Gabriel J. Chin, Do you Really Want a La-.yyer Who Doesn~t Want You?, 
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Instead, she chose to adopt a policy that automatically excludes 
men as clients, regardless of whether their legal claim offers the op­
portunity to advance gender equity in the law. 
Those of us who litigate gender discrimination cases participate 
not only in the construction of legal doctrine, but in the construc­
tion of social norms and beliefs about gender. 5 As lawyers, the 
claims that we make about sex and gender on behalf of our clients 
simultaneously reveal and construct a vision of gender. In seeking 
to eradicate the inequitable and discriminatory treatment of women 
in family law, Nathanson relies upon and reinforces the same stere­
otypical beliefs about sex and gender that she purports to attack. 
Her justification rests on an essentialist vision of gender which as­
sumes, and reinforces, the legitimacy of gender as a classificatory 
scheme. 
Nathanson advances several related arguments to justify her 
female-only divorce practice. Nathanson claims that she seeks to 
devote her expertise to the elimination of gender bias in the court 
system. She also claims that the issues that arise in representing 
women differ from those that arise in representing men in divorce 
proceedings.6 As an example, she argues that wives' attorneys em­
phasize the value of homemaker services, while husbands' attorneys 
do not.? Nathanson also argues that she needs to feel a personal 
commitment to her client which she has only experienced in family 
law by representing women. Moreover, she asserts that her female 
clients feel more comfortable because they view her decision to rep­
resent only wives as evidence of her commitment to their interests, 
and that she is more credible as an advocate because the judges 
know that she only represents women.8 
Like Martha Minow, I believe that Nathanson's defense of her 
female-only policy rests on an essentialized notion of gender.9 Na­
thanson's refusal to represent men, even if their cases offer the op­
portunity to advance gender equity, depends upon, and reinforces, 
5. In the Citadel litigation, for example, counsel for Faulkner and Mellette of­
fered the courts a competing construction of men and women which challenged the 
blatantly essentialist vision of South Carolina that women, because of their tempera­
ment and character, inherently were not suited for stressful, military-style education. 
See, e.g., Valorie K. Vojdik, At War: Narrative Tactics in the Citadel and VMI Litigation, 
19 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1996). 
6. Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 40. 
7. See id. 
8. See id. 
9. See Martha Minow, Foreword: Of Legal Ethics, Taxis, and Doing the Right 
Thing, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 5 (1998). 
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the traditional construction of gender and sex as essential and natu­
ral, rather than socially constructed and contingent. Her argument 
incorrectly assumes the truth of one of the most dangerous gender 
stereotypes: that all women are homemakers and all men are bread­
winners. Her justification assumes that all men are systematically 
advantaged in marriage and all women systematically disadvan­
taged, in the same manner. Nathanson's claim that she can only 
feel a personal commitment to female clients in family law matters, 
and that her clients feel reassured because she only represents 
women, appears to assume a natural and inherent affinity between 
women solely on the basis of their sex, regardless of their socioeco­
nomic status, race, religion, or age. While gender is a fundamental 
construction that helps create and limit women's identity in this cul­
ture, it does not follow that all women automatically share identical 
interests. There are vast differences among individual women in 
their socioeconomic status and race which intersect with their gen­
der to shape their experiences and interests. Carolyn Wexler, the 
former wife of a wealthy General Electric executive whose divorce 
and property fight was featured on the front page of the Wall Street 
Journal, does not have the same problems and constraints as, for 
example, a middle aged African-American woman with no savings 
and limited job skills who is entering a job market replete with ra­
cism.1O Indeed, the differences between these two women probably 
far exceed the similarities. 
Litigation strategies rooted in essentialism mask the social and 
cultural use of gender as a classification scheme that makes distinc­
tions between men and women appear natural. The myth of gender 
difference has been used throughout history to rationalize the ex­
clusion of women from the public sphere and to deny them power, 
opportunity, and status. 
Rather than reproduce essentialist notions of gender, we 
should embrace litigation strategies that challenge gender as essen­
tial and instead reveal it as socially constructed. Setting aside the 
question of his motivation for asking Nathanson to represent him, 
Joseph Stropnicky offered the opportunity to challenge the tradi­
tional construction of gender roles in marriage. As a husband, 
Stropnicky shunned the traditional role of breadwinner and instead 
10. Carolyn Wexler is a Connecticut homemaker whose divorce from her wealthy 
husband, the former chief executive officer of General Electric Capital Corporation, 
made front page headlines in the Wall Street Journal when a court awarded her a sub­
stantial portion of their marital estate. See Paul Bennett, "Corporate Wife" Gains in a 
Divorce Ruling, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1997, at Bl. 
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took responsibility for homemaking and child care.ll As a male, he 
transgresses the restrictive gender boundaries and norms of this cul­
ture. By breaking the association between his sex and gender, 
Stropnicky reveals gender as a social construction rather than a nat­
ural and essential category. It is within the space created by this 
disjuncture that we can begin to reconstruct sex, gender, and 
identity. 
My criticism of Nathanson is. not to suggest that feminist liti­
gators must represent any man that walks in the door. There may 
be circumstances which could justify a refusal to represent men 
which do not depend on an essentialist rationale. For example, a 
feminist lawyer might decide to handle only litigation challenging 
the lack of access of women to athletic programs under Title IX. 
The attorney then could refuse to represent any client, either male 
or female, whose case did not involve increasing athletic opportuni­
ties for women. The crucial distinction is that the attorney would 
not reject a particular male client solely because of his sex, but be­
cause of the nature of his claim. While the result will likely be the 
same, the key difference is that the attorney's decision to not repre­
sent the male client does not rest on essentialist assumptions about 
men and women, nor stigmatize the prospective client on the basis 
of a personal characteristic. Presumably this policy would meet 
MeAD approval under Stropnicky, which distinguished N athan­
son's refusal to represent Stropnicky because of his status as a man 
from a refu'sal by a lawyer to not represent a handicapped person 
because the lawyer does not handle handicap discrimination claims. 
There may be other' situations in a gender-based legal practice 
where tlIe exclusion of male clients does not stigmatize men by vir­
tue of their sex, but is justified as a benign compensatory measure. 
As feminist litigators, we are engaged in the necessary process 
of constructing gender, both inside and outside the courtroom. Our 
commitment to gender equity should guide our legal practice, as 
well as our legal arguments. If our goal is to promote inclusion in 
this society, we should not adopt litigation strategies that embrace 
exclusion without careful evaluation of their need and cost. 
11. Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 39. 
